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IN RE SILICON GRAPHICS INC.:
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS
RESULTING FROM THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM
ACT'S PLEADING STANDARD
MARILYNF. JOHNSON
KAREN K. NELSON

& A.C. PRITCHARD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article presents an empirical study of changes in shareholder
wealth resulting from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in In re
Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 1 which interpreted the pleading
provision established in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of

* University of Michigan Business School, Stanford University Graduate School of Business,
and University of Michigan Law School, respectively. We appreciate the helpful comments of Merritt
Fox, Ellen Katz, Joan Larsen, Ronald Mann, and Mark West, as well as those by participants at a
Fawley Lunch at the University of Michigan Law School and at a workshop sponsored by the Center
for Corporate Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Johnson acknowledges the support of
Ernst & Young, L.L.P. Nelson acknowledges the support of the Financial Research Initiative at the
Stanford Graduate School of Business. Pritchard acknowledges the support of the Cook Fund at the
University of Michigan Law School. In the interest of full disclosure, Pritchard was previously Senior
Counsel at the Securities and Exchange Commission and in that capacity wrote the Commission's
arnicus brief in Silicon Graphics. The views expressed here, however, are those of the authors alone
and do not represent the views of the Commission or its staff.
I. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). The case was a
securities fraud class action brought by shareholders who claimed misstatements about company
performance inflated the value of the company's stock and that corporate insiders profited from the
inflated price through insider trading. The court dismissed the claims based on the rigorous standard it
adopted. See id. at 980.
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1995 (the "Reform Act"). 2 Congress passed the Reform Act as part of an
ongoing effort to protect corporations from abusive suits alleging "fraud by
hindsight."3 In such suits, plaintiffs claimed that a sudden drop in a
company's stock price was evidence that the issuer and its management
covered up the bad news that led to the price drop. The Reform Act
discourages such suits by requiring complaints alleging fraud to "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.'>4 Courts have interpreted the Reform
Act's pleading standard in diverse ways.5
The Ninth Circuit's
interpretation in Silicon Graphics is the most stringent, requiring plaintiffs
to allege facts that would show the defendants were "deliberately reckless"
in making the misrepresentation that gave rise to the fraud claim.6 This
pleading standard allows courts to dismiss fraud suits at an early stage if
the court deems they lack merit, but it also increases the risk courts will
dismiss meritorious suits as well.
In this Article, we examine the effects of the stringent Silicon
Graphics standard using event study methodology to provide empirical
evidence regarding investors' perception of the Ninth Circuit's
Event study methodology
interpretation of the pleading standard.
previously has been used to assess the effect of state corporate law on
shareholder wealth.7 Our study differs from that prior work because it tests
the market reaction to a decision before the United States Supreme Court
has conclusively decided the question. Given the clear split in the circuit
courts over the interpretation of the pleading standard, the Supreme Court
is likely to eventually grant certiorari to resolve the issue. In the face of
textual ambiguity in the statute and confusion in the legislative history,
shareholder wealth provides one potential normative criterion the Supreme
Court could consider to determine the "correct" interpretation of the
Reform Act's pleading standard. In this case, social science has the
potential to directly influence the path of the law.8
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)4(b)(I) & (2) (West 1999).
3. Congress recently passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, see id., in an
effort to prevent such suits from being filed in state court See generally David M. Levine & Adam C.
Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Unifonn Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue
Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1 (1998).
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u4(b)(2).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 55-64.
6. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Lltig., 183 F.3d at 974.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
8. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
(predicting the influence of statistics and economics on the direction of law). Our study also responds
to Judge Posner's criticism that "so much legal scholarship and judicial analysis is unoriginal,
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We recognize that the use of wealth maximization as a normative
criterion for judicial decisionmaking is controversial. 9 But wealth
maximization for shareholders may be more acceptable as an appropriate
norm in the context of securities laws because investors unquestionably
purchase securities in an effort to increase their wealth. In particular, we
believe shareholder wealth provides the appropriate baseline for
interpreting the Reform Act because it best serves Congress' purposes in
adopting the law, and it best reflects the interests of investors, who are the
principal beneficiaries of the securities laws. 10 At a minimum, courts
should consider the effect that securities law decisions have on shareholder
wealth when empirical evidence is available, as it is here, and Congress has
not clearly expressed a contrary intent.
Two competing hypotheses may explain the effect of Silicon
Graphics' rigorous pleading standard on shareholder wealth: (1) the high
standard primarily discourages suits that, regardless of their merits, are not
cost-justified in terms of deterring fraud, thereby enhancing shareholder
wealth on average; or (2) the high standard chills suits that are both
meritorious and cost-justified in addition to non-cost justified suits, thus
undermining deterrence and diminishing shareholder wealth. To determine
the effect of the Silicon Graphics decision on the wealth of shareholders,
we look at the stock prices of a sample of high technology companies from
the computer hardware, computer software, and pharmaceutical industries,
and a sub-sample of those companies headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. A
positive stock price reaction would support the first hypothesis, while a
negative reaction would support the second.
The Silicon Graphics decision has implications beyond the law of any
particular circuit. It offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the wealth
effects of the varying interpretations of the Reform Act's pleading standard
for three reasons. First, the Silicon Graphics "deliberate recklessness"
standard for pleading scienter is generally regarded as the most difficult
interpretation for plaintiffs to satisfy. The Securities and Exchange
Commission and other critics of the "deliberate recklessness" standard have
warned that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation will harm investors because it
unempirical, conventional, and unworldly, overwhelmingly verbal and argumentative (indeed, verbose
and polemical}, narrowly focused on doctrinal questions, mesmerized by the latest Supreme Court
decisions, and preoccupied with minute and ephemeral distinctions-rather than bold, scientific, and
descriptive." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 468 ( 1990).
9. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 374-87 (discussing the use of wealth maximization in legal
decisionmaking). See id. at 374 n.23 (collecting articles criticizing wealth maximization as a normative
criterion).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17.
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will discourage the filing of meritorious suits. 11 Since the plaintiff cannot
use discovery to determine what the defendants knew when they were
making the allegedly fraudulent statements, the case will be dismissed
unless the defendant can find evidence in public sources of the defendants'
fraudulent intent. 12 If cases of genuine fraud were dismissed or never filed,
deterrence would be undermined.
Second, the decision was unexpected. Given that the Ninth Circuit
previously had the least stringent requirements for pleading fraud, its
decision to adopt the most stringent interpretation under the Reform Act
caught many securities lawyers by surprise.13 Accordingly, the decision
was unlikely to have been anticipated by stock market participants and
reflected in stock prices prior to its announcement. 14 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit encompasses Silicon Valley, so the Silicon Graphics decision
governs a substantial number of companies commonly targeted by
attorneys bringing securities fraud class actions. 15 Thus, the decision is
likely to be of economic significance.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the economics of
securities fraud, the role of class actions in deterring that fraud, and why
11. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on Securities Litigation Abuses Concerning S. 1260, Tile
Securities Litigation Unifonn Standards Aci of1997, Before the Sub comm. on Sec. oftile Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, I 05th Cong. 13 (1997) ("A unifonn federal standard that did not
include recklessness as a basis for liability would jeopardize the integrity of the securities markets, and
would deal a crippling blow to defrauded investors with meritorious claims.") (statement of the SEC).
12. See Elliot J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve tile Procedural
Catch-22 that tile Private Securities Litigation RefonnAct Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457 (1998). See
also Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of tire Effect of tile
PSLRA's Jntemal-lnfonnation Standard on '33 and '34 Act Clai111S, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998).
Plaintiffs will not have access to discovery because of the Refonn Act's discovery stay, which bars
discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(8) (West 1999).
13. See, e.g., Patrick J. Coughlin, Ninth Circuit Panel's Opinion in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Conflicts With Other Circuits, 1136 P.L.lJCorp. 81 (Sept.-Oct. 1999) (plaintiffs' lawyer bemoaning
court's "surprising holding'').
14. See Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White,..Qf Econometrics and lndetenninacy: A Study of
Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551, 569 (1987) (market is less
likely to have anticipated judicial decision "where a decision appeared to depart from or reverse wellestablished authority"). See also Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of tile Takeover Statutes, 73
VA. L. REV. 111, 182 (1987) (discussing importance of identifying correct announcement date for a
particular legal change). The prior decisions of the Second and Third Circuits, which adopted the
existing Second Circuit tests, were likely anticipated by stock market participants and were therefore
unlikely to have produced a stock price reaction.
15. Section 27 of the Exchange Act allows plaintiffs to bring suit in any district "wherein any act
or transaction eonstituting the violation occurred" or "in the district wherein the defendant is found or is
an inhabitant or transacts business." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West 1999). While this may allow plaintiffs
to sue the issuer in a number of districts, plaintiffs are likely to bring suit in the district in which the
company is headquartered in order to name the individual defendants, such as the officers and directors.
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the effectiveness of that deterrent should be reflected in the price of
securities. Part ill provides background on the legislative history of the
Reform Act's "strong inference" pleading standard and explains how that
legislative history has created a dispute over the proper interpretation of
that standard.
Part IV describes the sample data and presents our findings. We find
that the interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard adopted in
Silicon Graphics produced positive abnormal stock returns for a sample of
high technology companies, particularly those headquartered in the Ninth
Circuit. We also find that this stock price reaction is more positive for
firms with a higher probability of being sued in a securities fraud class
action, but that this positive effect diminishes as the probability of being
sued for committing fraud increases. We conclude in Part V with some
observations on the use of event studies in statutory interpretation and,
specifically, on the use of shareholder wealth maximization as a normative
guide to the interpretation of the Reform Act.
II. SECURITIES FRAUD, CLASS ACTIONS, AND
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

An analysis of the effects of the Reform Act's pleading standard on
shareholder wealth requires a balancing of the benefits from deterring
securities fraud through class actions against the costs of such suits.
Securities fraud class actions are a beneficial enforcement device only if
the deterrence they produce is greater than the deadweight losses they
impose. In this Part, we analyze the costs of securities fraud, as well as the
benefits and costs of using class actions to deter that fraud.
The leading securities law treatise states, "[t]here is no science yet
known for quantifying the dollar value of fraud avoided; so in a sense,
policy judgments in this area are based on often widely varying guesses as
to whether increased fraud avoidance can be justified." 16 We disagree with
the premise that the "dollar value of fraud avoided" cannot be quantified
and we believe policymakers can do better than "guess" when making
policy in this area. The presence of fraud has the potential to seriously
depress stock prices by impairing managerial accountability, distorting
capital allocation, and reducing liquidity. Insofar as securities fraud class
actions provide an efficient enforcement device, stock prices generally
should reflect the effectiveness of those suits in deterring fraud.
16.

LoUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 701 (3d ed. Supp. 1999).
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A. COSTS FROM SECURITIES FRAUD
The typical securities fraud class action involves an alleged
misrepresentation regarding the company's operations, financial
performance, or future prospects that inflates the price of the company's
stock in secondary trading markets. 17 Left unchecked, misrepresentations
by company managers potentially have a number of negative effects on the
company's stock price. First, misrepresentations may impair the ability of
outside shareholders to monitor the firm's performance and, more
specifically, the performance of the firm's managers. Insofar as fraud on
the market makes it more difficult to scrutinize managerial performance, it
also may significantly impact the market for corporate control. Is Deterring
misrepresentations therefore may enhance monitoring of managers, which
may increase corporate profitability by reducing agency costs. Enhanced
monitoring through more accurate disclosure should be reflected in higher
share prices.
Fraud may also affect investors' resource allocation decisions. Fraud
harms capital allocation by enabling firms to raise money for investment
projects that are not cost-justified. Firms that issue securities tend to have
more forthcoming disclosure policies. I 9 Insofar as those disclosures are
fraudulent, investors will pay an inflated price for those securities.
Managers who fraudulently inflate their stock price may be able to invest in
projects that are not cost-justified, instead of paying cash flows to
shareholders in the form of dividends. 20 Alternatively, managers may use
fraud to keep the firm in business when its assets should be reallocated
through the bankruptcy process. Capital markets infected by fraud will
raise firms' cost of capital, which, again, should be reflected in lower stock
prices.
Most cases alleging fraud on secondary trading markets, however, are
not based on the fraud's effect on capital allocation: Firms are selling
I7. A smaller number of securities class actions involve a misrepresentation made in connection
with an offering of securities by the company. Section 11 of the Securities Act makes issuers strictly
liable for misstatements in a registration statement for a public offering. See IS U.S.C.A. § 77k (West
1999).
18. See Merritt B. Fox, Rethinking Disclosure liability in the Modem Era, 15 WASH. U. L.Q.
903, 909 (I997) (discussing the role of accurate stock prices in facilitating market for corporate

control).
19. See Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determinants of A11alyst Ratings of
Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. ACCT. REs. 246, 266 (1993) (finding statistically significant increase in
analysts' disclosure ratings for firms during periods of securities issuance).
20. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2545-50 (I997).
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securities in only a fraction of cases. Fraud on the market cases differ from
typical fraud cases in that the wealth transfers overwhelmingly occur
between equally innocent investors. For every shareholder who bought at a
fraudulently-inflated price, another shareholder has sold: The buyer's
individual loss is offset by the seller's gain. Assuming all traders are
ignorant of the fraud, over time they will come out winners as often as
losers from fraudulently-distorted prices.21 In the classic case of fraud, by
contrast, the people committing the fraud, not an innocent bystander,
directly benefit from the fraud by transferring wealth from the victim to
themselves. While the victim suffers an individual cost, the social cost of
the transfer is zero because the trader committing the fraud receives an
offsetting benefit. The social cost of fraud is not in the wealth transfer it
effects, but rather in the responses by individuals to that potential wealth
transfer. The wealth transfer induces the fraudulent trader to spend real
resources in executing the fraud, and potential victims to spend real
resources to avoid being victimized.22 Requiring traders who commit fraud
to compensate the victim discourages both the trader from investing in
fraud and the victim from incurring socially wasteful precaution costs
against fraud. 23
But in the typical fraud on the market case, the corporation has not
been trading in its own securities. Consequently, the corporation has not
transferred wealth to itself and, therefore, has no incentive to spend real
resources in executing the fraud. In theory, shareholders should have no
expected loss from fraud on the market if the fraud is perfectly concealed
until disclosure, so they would have no incentive to take precautions
against the fraud. Thus, fraud on the market should not create the usual
distorting effects of fraud.
But fraud is difficult to conceal completely. Fraud on the market, left
unchecked, will induce some investors to try to beat the market by
investigating the statements made by the company. Informed traders, who
are already expending substantial resources to evaluate a company's stock
21. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 639, 646 (1996). "At least active traders with large diversified portfolios have roughly the
same chance of being winners as losers from securities fraud, and over time these gains and losses will
tend to net out toward zero even in the absence oflitigation." Id.
22. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78
VA. L. REV. 623, 630 (1992) "If fraud is not deterred, market participants will take expensive
precautions to uncover fraud so as to avoid entering into bargains they would not have concluded in an
honest market." Id.
23. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATELAW321 (1991).
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price, are likely to reallocate some of their efforts from investigation to
verification in the presence of fraud on the market. Company insiders will
know of the fraud because of their role in its commission.24 Fraud on the
market, therefore, may create information asymmetries between traders that
would not otherwise exist. These information asymmetries mean potential
profits for informed traders and corresponding losses for the uninformed.25
To avoid these trading losses, uninformed traders would prefer to
trade only with other uninformed traders. Because securities markets are
largely anonymous, however, outsiders have no way of knowing when they
are trading with a counter-party possessing superior information. They do
know, however, that they will systematically lose when trading with the
better informed.26 Market makers who supply liquidity to the markets on
an uninformed basis will increase their spreads to reflect the possibility of
dealing with traders who have superior information.27 In addition,
uninformed shareholders will discount the amount they are willing to pay
for shares by their expected losses from trading with the informed.28 They
may also attempt to avoid these trading losses by trading less frequently. If
uninformed investors trade less frequently, a greater proportion of trading
volume will be made up of informed traders, creating an adverse selection
problem as more uninformed traders exit the market to avoid trading with
the better informed.29 Less trading means less liquidity, and less liquid
securities markets create higher execution costs for trades. 30 Thus, one of
the principal social costs of fraud on the market is the increased cost of
24. See Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements and
Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 73 Acer. REV. 131 (1998) (finding that in the presence of
fraud, insiders reduce their holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity).
25. See generally Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and
Consequences of Eamings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the
SEC, 13 CONTEMP. Acer. REs. 1 (1996) (reporting that short selling begins to increase two months
before the announcement of earnings manipulation).
26. See Michael Manove, The Hann from Insider Trading and lnfonned Speculatio11, 104 Q.J.
EcON. 823, 826 (1989) ("Insider traders buy at the right time and sell at the right time.... [l]t follows
that on the average, outsider traders are being induced to do the opposite.").
27. See MERTON H. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET VOLATILITY 157 (1991)
(discussing wider spreads and reduced liquidity caused by informed trading).
28. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 325 (arguing that shareholders will pay less for
stock when insider trading is expected).
29. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously lnfonned Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 74 (1985) (describing
adverse selection problem created by the presence of informed traders).
30. See Dechow et al., supra note 25, at 29 (reporting that bid/ask spreads increase by .7% of the
company's stock price after announcement that company has engaged in earnings manipulation).
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trading securities.31 This higher liquidity cost will also be reflected in
lower stock prices.3 2
In sum, investors should value devices that reduce the incidence of
fraud. Evidence for this claim can be found in the practice of providing
financial statements audited by reputable accounting firms and governance
devices like audit committees of outside directors to provide independent
oversight of company disclosures. Shareholders should also value external
monitoring devices that deter fraud, including SEC enforcement and
criminal prosecution of fraudsters. 33 Class actions also have the potential
to deter fraud. The effectiveness of all of these devices can be measured by
their impact on shareholder wealth. We discuss the factors that may
undermine the cost effectiveness of class actions in the next section.
B. BENEHTS AND COSTS OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS

Class actions are a central component of the federal securities laws'
anti-fraud regime. The SEC considers private class actions a "necessary
supplement" to its own efforts in policing fraud. 34 In fraud on the market
class actions, plaintiffs' attorneys sue the corporation and its officers under
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.35 The plaintiffs are classes of
investors who have paid too much for their shares or (less frequently) sold
their shares for too little because of price distortion caused by the
misstatements.
In the typical case, the corporation being sued neither bought nor sold
its securities and, accordingly, did not gain from the fraud. Nonetheless,
fraud on the market suits allow investors to recover their losses from the
corporation based on its managers' misstatements. Given the trading
volume in secondary markets, the potential recoverable damages in such
suits can be a substantial percentage of the corporation's total
capitalization, easily reaching hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, class
actions are a potential punitive sanction that should provide a substantial
deterrent to fraud.
31. See Charles M. C. Lee, Market Integration and Price Execution for NYSE-Listed Securities,
48 J. FIN. 1009, 1014 (1993). The loss ofuninfonned traders may lead to greater quoted spreads and
higher liquidity costs. See id.
32. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1429 (1996).
33. Other devices may be available, including regulation by the securities exchanges. See A.C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities
Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999).
34. Lamp v. Gilbertson, 501U.S.350, 376 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2000).
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The effectiveness of that deterrence will be determined by how closely
class action suits correlate with the actual incidence of fraud. Congress
passed the Reform Act because it believed that the targeting of class
actions was not very precise. Plaintiffs' lawyers were filing suits "citing a
laundry list of cookie-cutter complaints" against companies "within hours
or days" of a substantial drop in the company's stock price.36 Moreover,
plaintiffs' lawyers had incentives to "file frivolous lawsuits in order to
conduct discovery in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim not alleged in
the complaint."37
Sorting fraud from mere business reversals is difficult. The external
observer may not know whether a drop in a company's stock price is due to
a prior misstatement about its prospects-fraud-or a result of risky
business decisions that did not pan out-bad luck. Unable to distinguish
the two, plaintiffs' lawyers are forced to rely on the limited publicly
available objective indicia when deciding to sue.38 Thus, a substantial drop
in stock price following previous optimistic statements may well lead to a
lawsuit.
The scienter standard establishes the defendants' requisite knowledge
of falsity at the time of the misstatement and is the primary means by
which courts sort fraud from non-fraud. But the standard is notoriously
amorphous. It is somewhat more stringent than negligence, but even in
theory it is difficult to say how much more, and it is nearly impossible in
practice.39 Knowingly false statements and unfortunate business decisions
both create a risk of liability and, thus, provide a basis for filing suit. An
uncertain standard for liability therefore makes filing a diverse portfolio of
cases a reasonable strategy for plaintiffs' lawyers.
Filing numerous cases is profitable for plaintiffs' attorneys because of
the incentives that defendants face. If plaintiffs can withstand a motion to
36. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 16 (1995). Compare Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits
Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (arguing that
settlement values are unrelated to strength of case), with Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108
HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994) (arguing settlement values are related to strength).
37.
38.

s. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995).
See Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider Stock Sales in Rule IOb-5 Corporate Disclosure
Cases: Separating the Innocent from the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 97, 111 (1994):
Many plaintiffs' attorneys look for a convergence of three factors in determining whether
there is a good securities fraud case: (l) optimistic statements by management; (2) a
subsequent disclosure of "bad news" about the prospects of the company that causes a sharp
stock price drop; and (3) stock sales by insider during the time management made the
allegedly misleading optimistic statements.

Id.
39. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 650 (arguing that the line between negligence and intent in
securities fraud has become blurred).
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dismiss, defendants generally will find settlement cheaper than litigation.
Any case plausible on the pleadings will have a positive settlement value if
only to avoid the costs of discovery and attorneys' fees, which can be
substantial in these cases.40 Securities fraud class actions are expensive to
litigate because the most common fighting issue will be scienter. The most
helpful source for uncovering this fact will be the documents in the
company's possession.41
Producing all documents relevant to the
knowledge of senior executives over many months or even years can be a
massive undertaking.42 Having produced the documents, the company can
then anticipate a seemingly endless series of depositions, as plaintiffs'
counsel seeks to determine whether the executives' recollections square
with the documents.43 The cost in lost productivity may dwarf the expense
of attorneys' fees and other direct litigation costs.44
Beyond the cost in executives' time, the mere existence of the class
action may disrupt relationships with suppliers and customers, who may be
somewhat leery of dealing with a party accused of fraud. 45 The Supreme
Court has recognized that securities fraud suits pose "the threat of extensive
discovery and disruption of normal business activities.' 746 Ignoring the
costs of litigation, the enormous potential damages also make settlement an
attractive option for the company, even when it seems that the prospects of
prevailing are good.47 Thus, defendants' inclination to settle gives
plaintiffs' lawyers an incentive to file even weak cases.
40. See Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Constance E. Bagley, Great Expectations: Risk Management
Through Risk Disclosure, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 155, 156 (1994) (describing corporation's costs of
responding to securities class action).
41. See Sherrie R. Savett. The Merits Matter Most and Observations on a Changing Landscape
Under the Private Securities litigation Reform Act of 1995, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 526 (1997).
42 See John F. Olson, David C. Mahaffey & Brian E. Casey, Pleading Reform, Plaintiff
Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 Bus. LAW. 1101, 1112-13 (1996)
(describing discovery request to which defendant corporation produced 1,500 boxes of documents).
43. See Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE LJ. 2053,
2086-87 ( 1995).
44. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of

I995: Rebalancing litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers,
51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1027-28 (1996) ("Officers, directors, and employees of companies are sidetracked
from focusing on their core activities. Corporate officials must spend untold hours in a variety of
litigation exercises that otherwise could be devoted to productive uses.").
45. See id. at 1028 (describing collateral costs to corporation's business from being a securities
fraud defendant).
46. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975).
47. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1511 (1996) ("The class-based compensatory damages regime in theory imposes remedies
that are so catastrophically large that defendants are unwilling to go to trial even if they believe the
chance of being found liable is small.").
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The settlement dynamic in securities class actions reduces the
deterrent value of such suits. The cost of litigating securities class actions
and the potential for enormous judgments mean that even weak cases may
produce a settlement if they are not dismissed before trial.48 Congress
believed the difficulty in assessing the merits of a lawsuit by looking at the
complaint allowed a substantial number of weak cases to make it through
to settlement.49 Thus, settlements may do a poor job of sorting strong
claims of fraud from non-fraudulent statements that were proved wrong
only in hindsight.so If both weak and strong cases lead to settlements, the
deterrent effect of class actions will be diluted because both innocent and
wrongful conduct will lead to sanctions.SI Worse yet, finns have
incentives to commit fraud to conceal poor performance if poor results can
lead to a securities fraud class action. If that happens, imprecise deterrence
is worse than no deterrence at all.
III. THE REFORM ACT'S PLEADING STANDARD
Congress attempted to improve the screening process for securities
class actions when it enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.
The Reform Act adopted a series of procedural obstacles to securities fraud
class actions designed to weed out nonmeritorious actions at an early stage.
Early dismissal greatly reduces the expense to corporations forced to
defend such suits, thereby limiting the settlement value of weak cases.
The pleading standard established by the Reform Act gives the judge a
more significant role in deciding the merits of the lawsuit than is typical
48. On the subject of incentives to bring nonmeritorious cases, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 448 (1988); Avery Katz, The Effect of
Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, IO INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 3, 14 (1990); D.
Rosenberg & S. Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV.
L. & EcON. 3, 9-10 (1985).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 17 (1995).
50. The percentage of securities fraud suits settling for nuisance value testifies to the weakness of
judicial procedures as a screening device. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 727, 742-43 (1995) (reporting results of studies finding that between 22% to 60% of securities
suits are settled for nuisance value); Willard T. Carleton, Michael S. Weisbach & Elliott J. Weiss,
Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptil>e Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 511 (1996) (finding
"smaller settlements/damages ratios [defined as roughly equivalent to the defendants' costs in
defending the suit] for cases in which settlements were less than $2 million, which is consistent with the
presence of nuisance suits settled on the basis of plaintiffs' attorney's expenses rather than on the
economic damages suffered by plaintiffs").
51. See I.P.L. Png, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error, 6 INT'L
REV. L. &EcoN. 101, IOI (1986) ("[T]o the extent that an individual who has not violated the law will
be made to pay damages, the cost of violating the law, relative to not doing so, will be reduced. The
result will be more violations of the law.").
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under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Reform Act's
pleading standard, plaintiffs must specify in their complaint each statement
alleged to have been misleading and the reasons why the statement is
misleading.52 In addition, if an "allegation is made on information and
belief, the plaintiff shall state with particularity all facts on which the belief
is formed." 53 Finally, the pleading standard requires plaintiffs to state with
particularity facts giving rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant
acted with "the required state of mind."54 By requiring plaintiffs to plead
facts demonstrating scienter, the motion to dismiss becomes a substantive
challenge to the merits of the lawsuit, a substantial departure from the
"notice pleading" ordinarily required by the Federal Rules.
The
significance of this departure is enhanced by the fact that plaintiffs are left
without the usual access to discovery to bolster their complaint.
A.

HISTORY OF THE PLEADING STANDARD

Not surprisingly, the Reform Act's pleading standard was among the
most contentious of the provisions debated by Congress. The pleading
standard was intended to resolve a dispute that had arisen in the courts of
appeals. While every federal appellate court that addressed the question
has held that "recklessness" satisfies the scienter requirement for liability
under Section lO(b) of the Exchange Act,55 they had differed on the
question of what was required to plead an adequate complaint under that
section. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
plaintiffs plead the circumstances giving rise to a claim of fraud "with
particularity," but allows state of mind to be "averred generally."56 The
Second Circuit held that pleading scienter under Section lO(b) requires
"plaintiffs to allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent
intent."57 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding the Second Circuit's
interpretation inconsistent \vith the plain language of Rule 9(b). It instead
52. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(l) (\Vest 1999).
53. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1994).
55. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane).
The most commonly cited definition of recklessness is the one from Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical

Corp.:
[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents
a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious
that the actor must have been aware of it.
553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp.
719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
57. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
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held that plaintiffs could adequately plead a complaint "simply by saying
that scienter existed."58
The legislative history of the Reform Act is contradictory. At times it
suggests Congress was trying to codify the Second Circuit standard, and at
other times it suggests Congress was setting an even more rigorous
standard. 59 Most courts, including the Second and Third Circuits, have
construed the Reform Act's pleading provision as adopting the Second
Circuit's tests for satisfying the strong inference standard.60 Prior to
passage of the Reform Act, the Second Circuit had held that its strong
inference standard could be met by pleading facts that would satisfy either
of the two tests. In the absence of direct evidence of the defendant's
fraudulent intent, the plaintiff must allege either: (1) facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless misbehavior, or (2)
facts showing motive and opportunity to commit the fraud. 61 Other courts,
including the First, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, have rejected portions of
the Second Circuit's approach. While not rejecting the circumstantial
evidence of the recklessness test, these courts have held that motive and
opportunity do not necessarily suffice to create the strong inference of
scienter required by the Reform Act.62 These courts have held that motive
and opportunity should be used only as factors to be considered in
evaluating circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior or recklessness. 63
Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in Silicon Graphics, rejected both the motive and
opportunity test and recklessness as bases for pleading scienter under the
Reform Act. Instead the court required plaintiffs to plead that the
defendants knew that the statements were false, or that the defendants were
"consciously" or "deliberately" reckless in disregarding the truth or falsity
of the statements. 64
Congress clearly modeled the Reform Act's pleading standard on the
demanding "strong inference" requirement of the Second Circuit. The
Reform Act's "strong inference" standard for pleading scienter originated
58. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 154I, I547 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
59. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The Refonn Act's
legislative history on this point is ambiguous and even contradictory.'').
60. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (dicta); lt1 re
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999).
61. See, e.g., Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128.
62. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285-87 (11th Cir. 1999); Greebel v. FrP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185,
196 (1st Cir. 1999).
63. See, e.g., Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.
64. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
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in Senate Bill 240, the Senate precursor to the Act. As reported by the
Senate Banking Committee, Senate Bill 240 mandated that the complaint
"specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind." 65 When the Senate bill reached the
floor, Senator Specter offered an amendment purporting to codify the tests
used by the Second Circuit in applying the strong inference standard, which
the Senate adopted.66 But Specter's amendment codifying these tests was
deleted by the Conference Committee.67 The Statement of Managers
produced by the Conference Committee that reconciled the House and
Senate versions of the Reform Act explained this decision:
The Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit. The standard also is specifically written
to conform the language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading with
"particularity."
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit
requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and that
these facts, in tum, must give rise to a "strong inference" of the
defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to
codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard.68
Thus, the Conference Committee made it clear that it was adopting the
Second Circuit standard, at least "in part," but it did not want to incorporate
the Second Circuit's cases applying that standard. A footnote appended to
the above quoted portion of the Statement of Managers elaborated: "For
this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading
65. S. 240, 104th Cong. § 104 (1995). The Senate Banking Committee's report makes clear that
Congress modeled the Act's pleading standard on the Second Circuit's:
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would generate
additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the
pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard,
the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference"
of defendant's fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard, although courts may find this body of
law instructive.
S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
66. See 141 CONG. REC. S9200 (1995).
67. The Conference Committee also changed the language of the standard from "specifically
allege" to "plead with particularity" based on the recommendation of the Judicial Conferenee that the
provision be amended to conform to Rule 9(b)'s particularity language. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9066-67
(1995). This does not appear to have intended any substantive change.
68. 141 CONG. REC. Hl3702 (1995).
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Congress' actions with regard to the pleading standard create two
conflicting interpretive presumptions. First, absent contrary evidence,
courts ordinarily presume Congress intended to adopt the settled judicial
constructions of a rule when it incorporates that standard into a statute.70
Because the settled judicial construction of the Second Circuit's pleading
standard includes both the circumstantial evidence of scienter test and the
motive and opportunity test, it could be assumed that Congress intended
that courts would rely on those tests in interpreting the pleading standard of
the Reform Act. The second presumption arises from the Conference
Committee's deletion of the Specter amendment. When Congress
expressly declines to adopt specific statutory language, "its action strongly
militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it
expressly declined to enact."71 Thus, this interpretive presumption
suggests that the courts should not rely on the Second Circuit's tests.
President Clinton cited the Statement of Managers as one of his
reasons for vetoing the Reform Act. In his veto message, he stated:
First, I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report
with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable
procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I
am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any
Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the
Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond that
level. I am not prepared to accept that.
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and
adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case
law with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically
indicated that they were not adopting Second Circuit case law but instead
intended to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the
Second Circuit. All this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher
barrier to bringing suit than any now existing-one so high that even the
69. 141 CONG. REC. H13705 n.23 (1995).
70. See Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991) ("Because these
decisions were part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress enacted [the statute] ... we
may presume that Congress intended to codify these principles ...."); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
581 (1978) ("[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law,
Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.").
71. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
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most aggrieved investors with the most painful losses may get tossed out
of court before they have a chance to prove their case.72

Given that Congress subsequently overrode the President's veto, the
most obvious interpretation of its action would be that it favored the
President's interpretation of the pleading standard. But in the floor debate
following the President's veto, Senator Dodd and the other managers of the
Reform Act distanced themselves from that interpretation. Senator Dodd
argued the President had "reversed course on the pleading standards"
which the President had previously endorsed.73 The Senator explained that
the Conference Committee had omitted the Specter amendment because it
"did not really follow the guidance of the second circuit."74 The pleading
provision, contrary to the President's belief, "met [the Second Circuit]
standard.... We have left out the guidance. That does not mean you
disregard it."75 Senator Domenici reiterated that the Reform Act's pleading
standard "is the Second Circuit's pleading standard" and was a
"codification of the Second Circuit rule."76 Evidently rejecting President
Clinton's arguments, Congress voted to override his veto.77 Given the
remarks of the Reform Act's Managers urging an override of the veto,
another interpretive presumption arises: The President's understanding of
the Reform Act in his veto message should be ignored.78
B. EFFECTS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PLEADING STANDARD ON
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

The conflicting presumptions arising from the Reform Act's
legislative history have led to interpretive confusion in the courts over how
demanding the pleading standard should be.79 Courts reviewing that
72. 141 CONG. REC. Hl5215 (1995).
73. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9067 (1995).
74. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (1995).
75. Id.
76. 141 CONG. REC. S19150 (1995).
77. See 141 CONG. REC. H15224 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. Sl9180 (1995).
78. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 235 (1978) (rejecting interpretation
in Presidential veto message when supporters of the legislation disagreed with that interpretation of the
bill during post-veto debate).
79. The use of legislative history to interpret ambiguous statutes has both its defenders and its
detractors. Compare Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992), and Patricia M. Wald, The Siu.ling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Constrning Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277
(1990), with John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673
(1997), and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story ofHoly Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998). We take no position on this controversy;
we simply note that judges are avid users of this interpretive resource.
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legislative history can find support for each of the three interpretations that
have been adopted. Quite arguably, each of the three interpretations can be
considered "correct" based on traditional rules of statutory interpretation.
We agree with the conclusion of the First Circuit:
The legislative history is inconclusive on whether the [Reform] Act was
meant to either embody or to reject the Second Circuit's pleading
standards. . . . At best, there appears to have been an agreement to
disagree on the issue of Second Circuit standards (other than the strong
inference standard), and perhaps, as is common, to leave sueh matters for
courts to resolve. 80

It is likely that the Supreme Court eventually will be obliged to grant
certiorari to resolve the conflict. Congress did, after all, express its
intention that pleading standards be uniform, even if it was less than clear
on what that standard should be.81
An ultimate decision by the Supreme Court will have significant
policy consequences. If the Court adopts a strict interpretation of the
pleading standard, fraud claims that are not plausible on the face of the
complaint will be dismissed. If such an interpretation discouraged only
meritless suits, it could reduce the enormous transaction costs imposed by
those suits, thereby producing deterrence at a lower cost. On the other
hand, if the bar for pleading an adequate complaint is set too high, it may
screen out a large number of meritorious suits, as well as the frivolous, thus
undermining deterrence. In the next Part, we attempt to shed some
empirical light on how the Court should strike that balance.
IV. DATA AND FINDINGS
Event study methodology is a well-established means for measuring
investors' perception of the effect of an economic event on shareholder
wealth, and it is widely used in the context of the securities laws. Indeed, the
event study methodology used here relies on the Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis-which is also the fundamental premise of the fraud on the
market class action. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis postulates that
stock prices rapidly incorporate publicly available information regarding the
80. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999).
81. The Reform Act's Statement of Managers explains Congress' concern that the pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had "not prevented abuse of the
securities laws by private litigants" and that the courts of appeals had "interpreted Rule 9(b)'s
requirement in conflicting ways." 141 CONG. REC. Hl3702 (1995). The Statement of Managers also
notes that Congressional hearings had "included testimony on the need to establish unifonn and more
stringent pleading requirements." Id. That goal of unifonnity has not yet been achieved.
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value of those shares.82 In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,83 the Supreme Court
endorsed the use of stock price effects to establish that the market relied on
misstatements.84 Courts have also relied on the event study methodology
employed here in other contexts concerning the federal securities laws,
including the measurement of damages in open-market fraud cases85 and to
demonstrate the materiality of misstatements.86
Those uses of event studies are distinguishable, however, from the use in
this Article in that they help resolve evidentiary questions arising from the
application of the law to the facts of a given case. But event studies have also
been used to assess corporate law decisions by Delaware courts.87 Related
studies attempt to measure the value of incorporating in Delaware.88 In
addition, studies have assessed the shareholder wealth effects of state antitakeover legislation.89 We use the same methodology to test the effect of the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Reform Act in Silicon Graphics.

In an earlier study, two of us found that the passage of the Reform Act
produced positive abnormal stock returns, on average, for shareholders of a
sample of high technology companies.90 The market reaction was most
positive for firms with a high overall probability of being sued in a securities
class action. For those firms that had the highest risk of fraudulent financial
82.
See JAMES LORIE, PETER DODD & MARY KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE 55-75 (2d ed. 1985) (describing empirical evidence supporting the Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis).
83. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
84. Id. at 246 ("Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any
material misrepresentations.").
85. See Janet Cooper Alexander, 17ze Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1421, 1428-62 (1994) (discussing courts' reliance on stock price events studies in measuring damages);
Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Moigan, Using Finance 17zeory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the
Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REY. 883 (1990).
86. See Mruk L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, 17ze Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud
Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545 (1994).
87. See Sreenivas Kamma, Joseph Weintrop & Peggy Wier, Investors' Perceptions of the Delaware
Supreme Court Decision in Unocal v. Mesa, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 419 (1988). See also Weiss & White, supra
note 14.
88. See Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The Recent
Experience, 18 J. FIN. MGMT. Ass'N 29 (1989); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate
Cluirters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980). See also Robert
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Finn Value? (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(using cross-sectional study to assess marginal value of Delaware corporate law).
89. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State
Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. EcoN. 291 (1989). See also Romano, supra note 14.
90. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the
Private Securities litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 REY. ACCT. STUD. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript on
file with authors).
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reporting practices, however, shareholder returns were significantly lower.
Nonetheless, on balance the market appears to have expected that the benefits
of discouraging weak lawsuits would be greater than the costs of reduced
deterrence.
That study did not allow for examination of the wealth effects from
particular provisions of the Reform Act. Consequently, it cannot be
determined from that evidence whether investors considered the heightened
pleading standard to be wealth-enhancing. It is possible that certain
provisions of the Reform Act, such as the discovery stay and the safe harbor
for forward-looking statements were wealth-enhancing, while the pleading
standard was wealth-diminishing. The Silicon Graphics decision provides an
opportuuity to focus on the effects of the Reform Act's pleading standard.
A. THE SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
To test the effects of the Silicon Graphics decision on shareholder
wealth, we select a sample of firms that historically have been vulnerable to
class action securities litigation. These firms are therefore the ones most
likely to be affected by the interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading
standard. Compared to firms in other industries, high technology companies
are involved in a disproportionately large number of securities lawsuits.91 We
use companies from three high technology industries-pharmaceuticals,
computer hardware, and computer software.92 Our initial sample consists of
311 public companies used in the event study discussed previously with stock
return data available to conduct our tests. We exclude thirty-two of these
firms with class actions pending at the time of the Silicon Graphics decision,
as the stock price reaction for these firms was likely to be dominated by the
reduced probability of liability in the pending suit. Additionally, we exclude
two firms that made public announcements of important corporate events on
the day of or the first trading day following the decision. Our final sample
thus includes 277 firms, ninety-three with headquarters located in the Ninth
Circuit and 184 with headquarters outside the Ninth Circuit.
91. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience (Feb. 1997) (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School Working
Paper No. 140); Christopher L. Jones & Seth E. Weingrarn, Why lOb-5 Litigation Risk ls Higher for
Technology and Financial Services Finns (July 1996) (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 112).
92. We use Standard Industrial Classification (the "SIC") codes to identify finns in these
industries-pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833-2836), computer hardware (SIC codes 3570-3577) and
computer software (SIC codes 7371-7379).
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The Ninth Circuit handed down its Silicon Graphics decision on the
morning of July 2, 1999.93 That same morning, the decision was posted on
the court's web site, and the clerk's office notified by telephone the lawyers
for the parties to the appeal. The lawyers notified their clients and interested
journalists that day.94 The decision also was announced at a securities
litigation conference in Colorado that afternoon.95 Later that evening, the
Associated Press ran the story on its newswire at 6:53 P.M.96 The AP story is
the first news account of the decision that we have found. Stories reporting
the decision ran in three major California papers-the San Jose Mercury
News, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Los Angeles Times-on July 3,
1999, a Saturday.97 Because the following Monday-July 5-was a holiday,
the story did not run in the Wall Street Journal until July 6.98 Given court
rules regarding confidentiality, we assume that the news of the decision was
not available to traders before July 2. Additionally, we conclude from the
widespread media coverage that virtually any securities analyst following
companies in the three high technology industries we examine was likely to
be aware of the decision on July 6. Accordingly, we examine stock return
data from July 2 through July 6, which includes only two trading days, the
second and the sixth.
The event study methodology requires a measure of abnormal returns.
The abnormal return is the actual stock return over the event period minus the
return expected if the event did not take place. The expected return is
obtained by estimating the relation between a given security's return and the
market return for a period prior to the event in question. This relation
93. A revised version of the decision was handed down by the court on August 4, 1999. Although the
amended opinion softened some of the language used in the opinion, the requirement that plaintiffs plead
"deliberate" recklessness to state a claim for securities fraud was not changed. See Antifraud: Ninth Circuit
Amends Ruling on Reform Act Pleading Standard, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1140 (Aug. 27, 1999).
The private plaintiffs and the SEC renewed their request for review of the decision by the full court after the
amended opinion was handed down. See id. We therefore did not collect stock price returns from August 4.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane on October 27,
1999. The plaintiffs did not petition the Supreme Court for certiorari.
94. Telephone Interview with Jerome Bim, counsel for Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Aug. 1999).
95. Telephone Interview with David Levine, attendee at National Economic Research Associates
Finance, Law & Economies Securities Litigation Seminar, June 30-July 2, 1999, Keystone, Colo. (Aug.
1999).
96. See Bob Egelko, Court Tightens Standard for Securities Fraud Suits, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, July 2, 1999, at 18:53:00, available in Westlaw ALLNEWSPLUS library.
97. See Howard Mintz, Federal Court Makes Securities Fraud Lawsuits More Difficult, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 3, 1999, available in 1999WL17354957; Reynolds Holding, Court Piiis limits on
Securities Fraud Suits, S.F. CHRON., July 3, 1999, at Al; David Maharaj & Herny Weinstein, Ruling
Tightens Standard in Investors' Fraud Suits, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1999, at Cl.
98. See Scott Thurm, Appeals Court Sets High Standards For Shareholders i11 Stock-Fraud Suits,
WALL ST. J.,July 6, 1999, atA23.
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provides a benchmark for determining the expected return of a firm's stock
during the event period, given the market return. We calculated the abnormal
return for each firm in the sample for the two trading days indicated above,
and added these daily abnormal returns to obtain cumulative abnormal returns
(the "CARs") for the event period for each firm. The overall CAR is an
average of the individual firm CARs. If investors viewed the Silicon
Graphics decision as beneficial to their interests, we would expect to observe
a positive average CAR. Conversely, if investors believed that the decision
harmed their interests, we would expect a negative average CAR.
More volatile firms are apt to have a larger absolute return on the event
date, even if the value of the firm is unaffected by the event being studied.
Therefore, the significance of the CARs is determined by constructing a Zstatistic that weights each individual firm's abnormal returns by the inverse of
the standard deviation of the returns, thereby giviug greater weight to the
CARs of the less volatile firms. 99
B. RESULTS
We find that there was a significant positive market reaction to the

Silicon Graphics decision, which is consistent with the hypothesis that
investors believed that the Ninth Circuit's stringent interpretation of the
Reform Act's pleading standard, on average, enhanced shareholder wealth.
As the graph below indicates, there was a cumulative positive mean abnormal
return of 1.78% over the two days following announcement of the decision.
This result is statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence, meaning
that there is less than a 1% chance that the result would occur purely by
chance.
The graph also compares the average CAR of firms headquartered in the
Ninth Circuit to that of firms with headquarters in other Circuits. These
results provide an even more striking picture of the impact of the Silicon
Graphics decision on shareholder wealth. The average CAR for those firms
most directly affected by the decision-the Ninth Circuit firms-is 2.79%,
compared to only 1.27% for the other firms in the sample. Both of these
results are significant at the 99% level of confidence. It is not surprising that
the non-Ninth Circuit firms should have a positive price reaction-before the
Ninth Circuit ruling, no appellate court had accepted the stringent "deliberate
recklessness" standard. 100 The Ninth Circuit's decision made it more likely
that other appellate courts, and more importantly, the Supreme Court might
99.
100.

Details of the procedure and statistical tests are provided in the Appendix.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
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accept the stringent standard. Nonetheless, the decision has its greatest effect
on Ninth Circuit companies, and the Ninth Circuit average CAR is
significantly greater than the non-Ninth Circuit average CAR at the 95% level
of confidence. Overall, then, the results support the proposition that investors
viewed the Silicon Graphics decision as favorable to shareholders' interests.
3.0
2.5
Average
CAR%

2.0

-

1.5
1.0

-

0.5

-

0.0
All Firms

Ninth Circuit

Other Circuits

MARKET REACTION TO THE SILICON GRAPIDCS DECISION
To put these results in more concrete terms, the average change in
market value for our sample companies was $12,429,000. 101 Once again, the
increase was substantially greater for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit,
despite the fact that these firms were considerably smaller, on average, than
the non-Ninth Circuit firms. 102 The average change in market value for Ninth
Circuit firms was $18,459,000, compared to $9,381,000 for the non-Ninth
Circuit firms in our sample. Thus, the Silicon Graphics decision had a
substantial impact, whether measured in percentage of value or dollar terms.

If investors believed that the high pleading standard adopted by the
Ninth Circuit would benefit shareholders by reducing the net cost of securities
litigation, as the above results suggest, then it should also be the case that
firms at greatest risk of being sued would benefit more than other firms. To
explore this possibility, we compare the market reaction to the Silicon
101. We calculated the change in market value by multiplying the cumulative abnonnal return by
the market value of the finn as of June 30, 1999 (just prior to the announcement of the decision).
102. The mean market values were $2 billion for the firms in the Ninth Circuit and $3.4 billion for
the non-Ninth Circuit firms.
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Graphics decision of firms with a relatively high probability of being sued to
the reaction of firms with a relatively low probability of being sued. We use
the following company characteristics as predictors for the filing of a
securities fraud lawsuit: 103
(I) Stock Price Volatility. Because securities class actions are often filed
when there is a large stock price decline, it is sometimes argued that
these lawsuits are related to the volatility of the firm's stock price. The
more volatile the stock, the more likely a large stock price decline that
will trigger the filing of a lawsuit.
(2) Stock Price Peiformance. Firms that have been performing poorly
are more likely to experience a stock price decline that will trigger a
lawsuit.
(3) CEO Power. Concentration of power in the hands of the Chief
Executive Officer of the company provides both the incentive and the
opportunity to engage in fraudulent activity.
(4) Monitoring. Fraudulent activity is more likely to occur when there
are weaknesses in the oversight of management by the board of directors
or outside auditors.
(5) External Financing. Firms have an incentive to fraudulently
manipulate investors' perceptions of firm value to obtain external
financing on more favorable terms, so fraud is more likely in periods
when the firm is issuing securities.
(6) Leverage. Firms with heavy debt loads relative to equity have an
incentive to engage in fraud to avoid violation of debt covenants and
default.

We estimate the relation between these six firm characteristics and
whether or not a firm was actually sued in the two years prior to the
passage of the Reform Act to determine the litigation risk of each of the
firms in our sample. We find that the probability of a lawsuit ranges from
3% to 83% in our sample, with an average probability of 27% over the twoyear period. Therefore, securities lawsuits are fairly frequent occurrences
for these firms, as expected. We use these estimated probabilities as a
proxy for firms' litigation risk. 104
We partition the sample firms into four portfolios based on the
probability that they will be sued. As we expected, the average abnormal
103. See Jones & Weingram, supra note 91; Jennifer Francis, Donna Philbrick & Katherine
Schipper, Detenninants and Outcomes in Class Action Securities Litigation (1994) (Working Paper,
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago); Patricia M. Dechow et al., supra note 25.
I04. The Appendix discusses the measurement of these variables and the procedure used to estimate
the probability of being sued.
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return is more positive for firms at greater risk of being sued in a securities
class action. The graph below reveals that the average CAR for firms with the
highest litigation risk was 2.61 %, which is statistically significant at the 99%
level of confidence. In contrast, the average market reaction for firms with
relatively low risk of litigation was only 1.19%, which is not statistically
significant.

Average
CAR%
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0.0
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THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION RISK ON THE MARKET
REACTION
Although the average CAR for the sample of high litigation risk firms is
more than twice that of the low risk sample, the difference is only significant
at the 90% level of confidence. It may seem somewhat surprising that
investors did not perceive that the Silicon Graphics decision would enhance
wealth for shareholders of firms at high risk of litigation significantly more
than that for shareholders of firms with relatively low risk of litigation,
especially because the Silicon Graphics interpretation discourages litigation.
This result is particularly surprising in light of the fact that litigation risk
appears to vary substantially across our sample. One possible explanation for
this lack of a statistically significant difference is that our measure of litigation
risk does not adequately capture firms' exposure to litigation. Although we
cannot rule out this possibility, another explanation deserves investigation.
Specifically, if investors distinguish between firms that are likely to be the
subject of a weak or frivolous lawsuit and those that are likely to be sued for
substantial fraud, our measure of overall litigation risk may mask the market's
reaction. Our measure contains components that are likely to correlate with
both nonmeritorious and meritorious lawsuits. If investors can distingnish
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between the two, the nonmeritorious and meritorious components may be
partially canceling each other out.
A review of the six characteristics that affect firms' susceptibility to
litigation suggests, all else equal, that the first two factors indicate a "strike
suit," whereas the last four factors are plausibly associated with the merits of
the plaintiffs' claims. Firms with minimal risk of a lawsuit due to fraudulent
activity stand to benefit the most from the Ninth Circuit's stringent
interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard, while those with a high
risk of being sued for committing fraud will benefit the least, if at all.
Obviously, deterrence is most valuable for those firms most likely to engage
in fraud, and the stringent Silicon Graphics standard is likely to reduce
deterrence by making it more difficult to bring suit. The findings reported in
the next graph support this contention. The average CAR for firms with
relatively little risk of litigation due to fraudulent activity is 2.71 %significant at the 99% level of confidence-while that for firms with a high
probability of being sued for fraudulent activity is only 0.96o/o-which is
statistically insignificant. Moreover, the average CAR for the lowest risk
portfolio is significantly greater than that of the highest risk portfolio at the
95% percent level of confidence.
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I• Risk of Fraud D Other Risk I
THE EFFECTS OF COMPONENTS OF LITIGATION RISK ON
THE MARKET REACTION
We expect to find the opposite pattern for firms whose litigation risk is
attributable to factors other than fraud. Firms at greatest risk of strike suits
stand to benefit the most from the high pleading standard adopted by the
Ninth Circuit. Although this is the same basic prediction we tested in the
graph above when partitioning the sample by litigation risk, the results are
much more striking when we remove the confounding effects of investors'
reaction to the possibility of genuine fraud. The 2.68% average CAR for the
portfolio of firms with the highest litigation risk is statistically significant at
the 99% level of confidence. 105 This compares to an insignificant mean return
of 0.51 % for the portfolio of firms with the lowest litigation risk. The
difference in returns is significant at the 95% level of confidence.
In sum, we find that the Silicon Graphics decision produced a
statistically significant, positive abnormal return for our sample of high
technology companies. The result was more positive for firms headquartered
in the Ninth Circuit (and therefore the firms most directly affected by the
l 05. Several readeis of prior drafts suggested that the overall positive stock price reaction might be the
result of establishing the legal standard and thereby reducing unpredictability. We think that is unlikely
given the unpredictability of the competing interpretations of the Reform Act's pleading standard. Simply
deciding what the rule will be does not increase predictability if the rule chosen is itself unpredictable. The
strong price reaction for firms at the highest risk of litigation suggests that the response is produced by lower
expected litigation costs, that is, the "deliberate recklessness" standard reduces the likelihood of suit and the
expected cost of settlement
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decision), but results were positive and statistically significant for non-Ninth
Circuit firms as well. When we divided our sample on the basis of the firms'
risk of securities litigation, we found that the abnormal returns were positively
related to the firms' likelihood of being sued. However, the difference _,
between the high litigation risk quartile and low risk quartile was not
significant at conventional significance levels. Finally, when we partitioned
our probability of litigation into factors related to meritorious plaintiffs'
claims and nonmeritorious factors, we found that the price reaction was
positively correlated with the nonmeritorious factors, but was negatively
related to the factors that indicated the possibility of fraud. These latter results
strongly support the view that the Ninth Circuit's decision drove the positive
stock price reaction for the overall sample, rather than some independent
cause.
V. CONCLUSION: THE USE OF EVENT STUDIES IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
How should courts interpret ambiguous statutes? A variety of answers
to this question have been offered, with the range seemingly limited only
by the imagination of law professors. 106 For those more focused on the real
world, however, Jane Schacter argnes that the actual practice of the
Supreme Court reflects a "common law originalism." 107 In her view, the
Court's approach is '"originalist' in that it uses statutory language as an
interpretive anchor and focal point," but it also reflects "the common law
form because it draws from an array of judicially-created sources to
delineate the ranges of plausible textual meanings and then to select from
among them." 108 Among these sources are a variety of policy norms such
as federalism. These norms provide "value-laden interpretive baselines
106. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 273-76 (advocating the "imaginative reconstruction" of the
enacting legislature); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE (1990) (advocating interpretation based on substantive canons intended to enhance
the working of the regulatory state); Ronald Dworkin, lAw as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 531
(1982) (advocating the interpretation of a statute "to show it as the best work of art it can be ••.•");
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stat11tes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (advocating the interpretation
of only detailed statutes according to the intention of purehasers); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (advocating interpretation that gives statutes
coherence and relevance for contemporary problems); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting P11blicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223 ( 1986) (advocating interpretation that mitigates the excesses of interest-group legislation).
107. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common lAw Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the.Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV.
I, 5 (1998).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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against which the meaning of the disputed language is measured and
assessed." 109 Reliance on these policy norms affords judges a substantial
role in determining the content of legal rules. 110
It is not our purpose in this Article to assess whether judges should
rely on such contestable policy norms when interpreting statutes. Instead,
our proposal is more modest: If judges are going to rely on policy norms
when faced with statutory ambiguity, the appropriate baseline norm for
interpreting the Reform Act should be shareholder wealth maximization.
We reach that conclusion for two reasons. First, we believe that norm best
reflects Congress' purposes in adopting the Reform Act. Second,
shareholder wealth maximization is the background norm that best serves
the interests of the parties governed by the securities laws.
Courts have not, to date, used event studies of shareholder wealth
effects as a guide to the interpretation of the federal securities laws-that
is, they have not relied upon shareholder wealth maximization in
determining the substance of the law .111 One obvious obstacle to the use of
shareholder wealth maximization as an interpretive tool is the Supreme
Court's decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson defining the scope of the
securities laws' antifraud prohibitions. 112 In that case, the Court clearly
rejected investor wealth in favor of investor protection, suggesting that it
was for Congress, not the courts, to implement such a shift in the focus of
the securities laws. 113
But this decision predates Congress' enactment of the Reform Act,
which may represent just such a shift. Congress' purposes in adopting the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act make shareholder wealth
maximization a more appropriate reading of congressional intent in this
context. According to the Statement of Managers that accompanied the
109. Id. at 24.
110. See id. at 25.
111. Event studies have, however, been used to resolve evidentiary questions. See supra text
accompanying notes 86-88.
112. 485 U.S. 224, 235 (1988):
[O]ne Court of Appeals has stated that "silence pending settlement of the price and structure
of a deal is beneficial to most investors, most of the time". We need not ascertain, however,
whether secrecy necessarily maximizes shareholder wealth-although we note that the
proposition is at least disputed as a matter of theory and empirical research-for this case
does not concern the timing of a disclosure; it concerns only its accuracy and completeness.
We face here the narrow question whether information concerning the existence and status of
preliminary merger discussions is significant to the reasonable investor's trading decision.
Arguments based on the premise that some disclosure would be "premature" in a sense are
more properly considered under the rubric of an issuer's duty to disclose. The "secrecy"
rationale is simply inapposite to the definition of materiality.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. See id.
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final version of the Reform Act, the Act was designed to achieve a balance
between investor protection and the deterrence of frivolous suits. Congress
claimed that it was seeking to protect the welfare of investors in striking
this balance:
The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect
investors and to maintain confidence in the securities markets, so that our
national savings, capital formation and investment may grow for the
benefit of all Americans .
. . . Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon
government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global
confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to
guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others
properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks to return the securities
litigation system to that high standard.
. . . When an issuer must pay lawyers' fees, make settlement
payments, and expend management and employee resources in
defending a meritless suit, the issuers' own investors suffer. Investors
always are the ultimate losers when extortionate "settlements" are
extracted from issuers.
This Conference Report seeks to protect investors, issuers, and all
who are associated with our capital markets from abusive securities
litigation. This legislation implements needed procedural protections to
discourage frivolous litigation. 114

This passage supports the view that Congress was seeking to
maximize shareholder wealth when it adopted the Reform Act's pleading
standard. Congress clearly recognized that securities fraud class actions
have costs as well as benefits and expressed its intention to balance those
costs and benefits for the benefit of shareholders.
Further evidence of Congress' preference for the consideration of
economic efficiency in interpreting the securities laws can be found in the
National Securities Market Improvement Act (the "NSMIA"). Passed in
1996, NSMIA directs the SEC to "consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation',' when it is engaged in rulemaking. 115 While this law is
directed toward the SEC, not the courts, it does suggest a change in
114.
115.

H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at31-32 (1995).
15 U.S.C.A. §78(c)(f) (West 1999).

2000]

SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS

803

Congress' attitude toward the securities laws from the paternalistic attitude
of the 1930s. It seems unlikely that today's Congress would want courts to
ignore efficiency concerns in interpreting the Reform Act, even if the text
of the statute does not specify that goal as NSMIA does.
In addition to reflecting congressional intent, shareholder wealth
maximization provides a normatively justifiable basis for balancing the
costs and benefits of securities fraud class actions.
Shareholders
presumably invest in securities in an effort to maximize their wealth, and,
therefore, they prefer governing rules tailored to that purpose. 116 To be
sure, our study's results do not establish that the Silicon Graphics
interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard benefits all
corporations. Our sample consists of only high technology companies, and
our results would not necessarily extend to other industry sectors.
Additionally, for those companies that were most likely to commit fraud,
the abnormal returns were statistically indistinguishable from zero, but
notably were not negative. For the shareholders of some companies,
raising the bar for securities fraud class actions may be neither wealthenhancing nor wealth-diminishing. The result for the firms most likely to
commit fraud suggests another policy prescription that might be drawn
from our study: Abolishing the fraud on the market class action
altogether 117 might well impose such a significant loss of deterrence that it
would produce a negative stock price reaction.

Our results do, however, provide evidence that market participants
believe that the hurdle imposed to securities fraud class actions created by
the Silicon Graphics rule is likely to enhance wealth on average-the price
reaction was positive for the sample as a whole. While these market
participants may be wrong in their assessment of the effects of the Silicon
Graphics decision, investors have powerful incentives to value these
effects correctly .118 Because the stock price effect was positive even for
firms that are unlikely to face litigation, it seems probable that companies
operating in sectors where securities fraud litigation is less common would
not experience negative stock returns from the decision.
Thus,
shareholders on average are likely to benefit from the Ninth Circuit's
116. See Romano, supra note 14, at 113 (describing "the maximization of equity share prices" as
"the core goal of corporation law").
117. The House proposed to do just that in the original version of the bill that became the Refonn
Act. See H.R. 10, l04th Cong., Title I, §204 (1995).
118. Courts are certainly in no better position to evaluate the effect of the standard, and their
incentives to be correct are not as stroug as the market participants. For a critique of the use of market
responses to evaluate judicial decisions, see Merritt B. Fox, The Role of the Market Model in Corporate
Analysis: A Comment on Weiss and White, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1015 (1988).
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interpretation. And most shareholders are likely to be average shareholders
because they hold a reasonably diverse portfolio, either by purchasing a
number of different stocks or by purchasing automatic diversification
through a mutual fund.
In a world where most shareholders hold diversified portfolios,
policymakers designing rules for shareholders' benefit will succeed if the
rules adopted are beneficial on average. Other stakeholders in the
corporate enterprise-managers, employees, creditors-presumably benefit
from rules that maximize shareholder wealth as well because such rules
reduce the corporation's cost of capital, thereby giving the corporation
greater resources with which to compensate its managers and employees
and greater ability to repay its debts. 119
In passing the Reform Act, Congress sought to maintain investor
protection while minimizing the costs imposed by securities fraud class
actions. Any interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard
necessarily entails a trade-off between those two goals. The tools of
statutory interpretation most frequently relied upon by courts-text and
legislative history-do little in this context to tell us where that balance
should be struck. Congress studiously avoided resolving the question in
the text of the statute, and the legislative history is hopelessly conflicted.
The Supreme Court will have to look elsewhere when it eventually resolves
the dispute over the proper interpretation of the pleading standard. The
empirical evidence presented in this Article suggests that the Silicon
Graphics interpretation of the pleading standard enhances shareholder
wealth. In the absence of a more compelling basis for picking among the
competing interpretations, we believe that evidence provides a strong basis
for the Supreme Court to accept the stringent interpretation adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics.
119.

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 38.
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APPENDIX

We measure the impact of the Ninth Circuit decision on our sample
firms by calculating the abnormal stock return on July 2, the date on which
the Ninth Circuit released its decision, and July 6, the first trading day
following the decision and the date on which coverage of the decision
appeared in the Wall Street Journal. We estimate the expected return using
the market model:

where R;, is the rate of return on stock i during day t, Rm, is the rate of return
on the market portfolio during day t, ~' and /31, are the parameters of the
model, and E;, is the error or disturbance term.
Daily stock returns and market returns for estimating the market
model were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
("CRSP") daily returns file. We use the S&P 500 market index as our
market index, although we obtain qualitatively similar inferences if we use
any of the following alternative market indices: (1) S&P Small Cap,
(2) NASDAQ, (3) Value Line, and (4) Wilshire 5000. The estimated
and
are obtained from an ordinary least
market model parameters,
squares regression of the market model over the 252 trading days of
calendar year 1998. The expected return is subtracted from the actual
return to obtain abnormal returns, ARil:

ai

pi '

We sum the daily abnormal returns over the two day event period to
obtain cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(t1,t2):

CAR <J1,t2)=t~t
t=t1
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We test the statistical significance of the abnormal returns using the
following Z-statistic: 120

where n is the number of observations in the sample, and the variance of
the cumulative abnormal return is defined as follows:

2

In this equation, V; is the residual variance from firm i's market
model regression, T is the number of days in the event period, ED is the
number of trading days in the estimation period, and Rm is the mean of
the market returns over the estimation period.
The following table reports the distribution of CARs for the full
sample of firms, and for the sample partitioned by the location of the
company's headquarters. We also report Z-statistics testing whether the
mean CAR is significantly positive (Zµ>0) and whether the percentage of
CARs that are positive is significantly greater than fifty percent (Z%>So%)·
The results reported in this table correspond to those presented in the first
graph in the Article.
120. See Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Withdrawn Security Offerings, 23 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVEANALYSIS I 19, 132-33 (1988).
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MARKET REACTION TO THE SILICON GRAPHICS DECISION

All Firms

Ninth Circuit

Other Circuits

(N= 2771

(N= 931

(N = 1841

Mean

1.78

2.79

1.27

Standard deviation

6.88

6.08

7.21

-1.35

-1.12

-1.44

Median

1.26

1.86

1.10

75th percentile

4.35

5.87

3.57

63.18

63.44

63.04

25th percentile

% positive

Zµ>0

4.88**

3.96**

3.17**

z%>so%

4.39**

2.59**

3.54**

* indicates significance at or above the 95% level of confidence.
** indicates significance at or above the 99% level of confidence.
To determine whether the market reaction was more positive for firms
at greatest risk of being sued, we identified six characteristics that affect
firms' susceptibility to litigation. The first two characteristics-Stock
Price Volatility and Stock Price Peiformance-we obtained from a factor
analysis of the following five variables: (1) market capitalization, (2) equity
beta, (3) share turnover, (4) prior cumulative returns, and (5) return
skewness. Factor analysis produces summary measures reflecting the
common correlation among the proxies while minimizing the correlation
among the constructed factor variables. The factor analysis yields the
following summary measures: Volatility (positively correlated with equity
beta and share turnover) and Peiformance (positively correlated with prior
cumulative returns and return skewness).
We obtained the two corporate governance characteristics-CEO
Power and Monitoring-from a factor analysis of the following seven
variables which we hand-collected from firms' proxy statements: (1) the
proportion of insiders on the Board of Directors, (2) the proportion of
common shares held by outside directors, (3) the presence of an audit
committee, (4) the use of a Big Six auditor, (5) the presence of an outside
blockholder, (6) the presence of a CEO who is also Chairman of the Board
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of Directors, and (7) the presence of a CEO who is also the founder of the
company. The first factor, CEO Power, is positively correlated with the
presence of a CEO who is Chairman of the Board and a CEO who is also
the company's founder, while the second factor, Monitoring, is positively
correlated with the existence of an audit committee, the use of a Big Six
auditor, and the presence of an outside blockholder.
Finally, External Financing is an indicator variable equal to one if the
firm issued either debt or equity during the two-year period preceding the
passage of the Act, and zero otherwise, and Leverage is equal to the
debt/equity ratio. We estimate the probability that each of the firms in our
sample will be sued using the following probit model:

Prob (litigatiollt =1) =F( £11> + /31Volatility; + /32Peifonnance; + /33CEO Power;
+ /34 Monitoring; + /35Financing; + /36 Leverage; )
where Litigation is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was a
defendant in a class action securities lawsuit, as reported in the Securities
Class Action Alert, and zero otherwise.
The following table reports the distribution of CARs for the sample
partitioned into quartiles based on the estimated risk of litigation. The
results reported in this table correspond to those presented in the second
graph in the Article. 121
121. We obtain similar inferences using a weighted portfolio regression approach, where the
portfolio weight is the firm-specific probability of litigation. See Stephan E. Sefcik & Rex Thompson,
An Approach to Statistical Inference in Cross-Sectional Models with Security Abnormal Retums as
Dependent Variable, 24 J. Acer. REs. 316, 334 (1986).
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THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION RISK ON THE MARKET REACTION

Litigation Risk Quartiles
Lowest Risk

2

3

Hig_hest Risk

Mean

1.19

1.79

1.52

2.61

Standard deviation

7.37

5.15

8.61

5.92

-2.18

-1.25'

-1.19

-0.57

Median

0.63

1.29

1.38

1.46

75th percentile

4.06

3.95

3.83

5.43

52.17

65.21

68.12

68.12

25th percentile

% positive

Zµ>0

1.63

2.52**

2.50**

3.09**

z%>50%

0.36

2.53**

3.01**

3.01*

* indicates significance at or above the 95% level of confidence.
** indicates significance at or above the 99% level of confidence.
To determine the component of total litigation risk attributable to the
probability that a firm will be sued for fraud, we reestimate the previous
model excluding the four fraud risk proxies, CEO Power, Monitoring,
Financing and Leverage. We then compute the difference between the
total probability of litigation obtained from the estimation of the full model,
and the probability of litigation obtained from the modified model. This
difference reflects the incremental contribution of fraud risk to firms' total
litigation risk.
The following table reports the distribution of CARs separately for the
sample partitioned into quartiles based on the estimated risk of litigation
due to fraud and the estimated risk of litigation attributable to other
sources. The results reported in this table correspond to those presented in
the third graph in the Article. 122
122.
118.

We obtain similar inferences using the weighted portfolio approach discussed supra note
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THE EFFECTS OF COMPONENTS OF LITIGATION RISK ON
THE MARKET REACTION

Fraud Risk Quartiles
Lowest Risk

2

3

Highest Risk

Mean

2.71

1.58

1.86

0.96

Standard deviation

7.08

5.44

6.51

8.21

-1.19

-1.87

-1.23

-0.80

Median

1.66

1.26

1.27

0.70

75th percentile

5.83

4.35

3.94

2.78

63.77

60.87

68.12

60.87

25th percentile

% positive

Zµ>()

4.00**

2.06*

1.98*

1.63

z%>50%

2.29*

1.81*

3.01**

1.81*

Other Risk Quartiles
Lowest Risk

2

3

Highest Risk

Mean

0.51

1.82

2.12

2.68

Standard deviation

9.34

5.71

5.80

5.87

-3.27

-1.24

-0.69

-0.60

Median

0.18

1.52

0.72

1.17

75th percentile

3.17

4.41

4.50

4.18

50.00

66.67

57.14

66.67

25th percentile

% positive

Zµ>()

1.20

2.90**

2.59**

3.09**

z%>50%

0.00

2.77**

1.32

2.77**

* indicates significance at or above the 95% level of confidence.
** indicates significance at or above the 99% level of confidence.

